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Abstract. This article reviews the existing academic literature that compares and explains the differences 
between the US and the EU’s external actions. An analytical matrix is devised to group publications 
by level of analysis (micro-, mid-, and macro) and by theme of comparison criteria. The key findings 
are that in the macro level of analysis, authors tend to compare the role actors have in international 
relations before claiming either that the EU is a different kind of power due to its peculiar historical 
experience, or that the EU is weak due to its complicated structure and lack of military capacities. 
Furthermore, authors conducting their analyses at the micro level tend to find more similarities between 
the EU and the US’s external actions than those working at the macro level. The article concludes by 
making a point in favour of further comparisons as an essential tool to better understand the EU and 
other actors in international relations.
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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) often pictures itself as different (i.e., more normative, civilian, or, 
generally more benign) than other traditional powers, especially in its relations with developing 
countries. This self-assessment is related to the Normative Power Europe (NPE) concept coined 
by Manners (2002). According to Manners, “Not only [was] the EU constructed on a normative 
basis, but importantly this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics” (2002, p. 252). 
As Diez observes (2005, p. 621), this vision of EU normativity and exceptionality, is based on its 
supposed differences from a specific nation that had traditionally wielded hard power: the US.
Authors from a variety of subfields in international relations (IR) ranging from regionalism 
(Grugel, 2004; Escribano, 2007; Hettne and Ponjaert, 2014) to security studies (Cox, 2003; Kagan, 
2002) observe similar differences between the EU and the US. Some claim that these actors not 
only prefer different models of cooperation with other countries and regions, but also represent 
Received: 2018 04 17. Accepted: 2018 09 15
Copyright © 2018 Ieva Giedraityte. Published by Vilnius University Press
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits unrestricted use, 
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Vilnius University Press
28
ISSN 2335-2337    eISSN 2424-5488   Baltic Journal of Political Science
completely different approaches in their logic of interaction in the international system. Some-
times the EU’s model of cooperation with other countries and regions is seen as more ethical or 
just (Escribano, 2007; Grugel, 2004; Hettne and Ponjaert, 2014). Yet, various studies refute claims 
regarding the EU’s normativity (Tocci, 2008; Hamilton, 2008; Diez, 2005), or observe that the EU 
and the US behave in a somewhat similar manner across various cases (Durac and Cavatorta, 
2009; Huber, 2017). 
Therefore, while the EU is indeed a unique actor—or even an “unidentified political object” 
according to Jacques Delors (1985)—it is less clear how this characteristic difference from other 
actors is reflected in the EU’s foreign policies, especially when it is compared to more traditional 
actors. Although comparison best highlights exceptionality, there are still doubts regarding whether 
it is fair to compare the EU with other states (Wright, 2011). 
Recent tensions among Western allies following the election of the new the US administration 
renewed discussions regarding the differences between the modus operandi of the EU and the US. 
Kupchan claims, “During previous rifts, they [the EU and the US] parted company over means ... 
This is the first time they are parting company over ends” (Johnson et al., 2018). The re-emerging 
debate presents an excellent opportunity to look at how claims about the EU’s exceptionality, in 
comparison to the US’s, were being tackled in academia. 
The purpose of this article is to review literature1 that compares the EU and US’s external 
actions and their foreign policy goals and instruments, to shed light on what I argue became a 
subfield in various IR disciplines. This review is concerned with three key lines of exploration: 
1) How can we compare the EU’s foreign policies to those of the traditional actor—a state—in 
IR? 2) When comparisons are made between the EU and traditional actors, what differences and 
similarities do we find and how do we explain them? 3) What do existing comparisons say about 
the EU as an actor in IR?
These questions structure this article. The first part of the article is dedicated to an overview of 
strategies authors use to address challenges related to the EU not being a traditional actor, result-
ing in comparison problems. In the second part, I examine comparative works, arranging literature 
thematically and by level of analysis. Existing literature is structured in four broad groups, each 
group is labelled according to the main topic of inquiry: regionalists, Atlanticists, security studies, 
and democratization studies. While presenting each group, I discuss differences and similarities 
identified by the authors and the arguments they use to explain them. This article concludes by 
claiming that comparing the EU to traditional actors is not only possible, but very necessary and 
fruitful for EU studies and also for other sub-fields of IR. Furthermore, while academic discussions 
show that on many occasions the EU acts similarly to traditional actors, it also exhibits exceptional 
characteristics. Finally, the article concludes with suggestions for further research.
1  Due to the object of this inquiry—foreign policy—the selection of articles was restricted to the field of politi-
cal science. The primary criterion for the selection of articles and books was topic: comparisons of the EU and the 
US’s external actions (in different spheres, but usually towards developing countries). While this comparison was 
a central goal for the majority of articles, in some cases it was more implicit, often with a purpose to explain the 
exceptionality of the EU, or (in the case of security-related literature) to understand a so-called “trans-Atlantic rift”. 
This article presents a sample of over 60 publications, published from the mid-1990s to 2017. 
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1. Comparing Apples and Oranges: Considering comparability
Before exploring relevant literature, I would like to address the issue of comparability as the EU 
is not a state and foreign policymaking is primarily in the hands of its member states. Given this, 
whether the EU can be considered an actor in IR at all is questionable. 
Sjöstedt set forth the first concepts related to attempts to define the EU’s (the European 
Economic Communities until 1993 (EEC)) role as an actor – the actorness.
He defined an actorness as two characteristics necessary for an entity to be considered an ac-
tor: “It must display a minimal degree of both internal cohesion and separateness from its internal 
environment” (Drieskens, 2017, p. 1536). The more recent, and by far the most popular, approaches 
of Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006) and Jupille and Caporaso (1998) argue for considering also 
the external constraints and opportunities posed by the EU’s structural environment (Klose 2018) 
and expand the number of characteristics necessary for an entity to be considered an actor. 
The concept of an actorness itself has been criticized for its lack of clarity and for being too 
attached to the case of the EU; many authors mix and match different elements of popular defini-
tions of an actorness and apply them to various aspects of the EU’s external governance (Drieskens, 
2017). Despite criticisms, actorness can still be considered a helpful heuristic device for studying 
relevant elements of the EU’s capacity to act (Drieskens, 2017, p.1537-1538). Another, somewhat 
less strict concept used to define the EU as an actor in IR, is presence. This approach gives priority 
to being over acting, and holds that the EU has an international impact because it is different from 
state actors (Drieskens, 2017, p. 1541). The separation of presence from actorness is a promi-
nent feature of this approach (Hoffman and Nieman, 2018). Allen and Smith (1990) argue that 
although the EC could not fulfil the criteria to be considered an actor, it has significant presence 
in the international system. The argument of presence is strongly related to the NPE concept as, 
according to Manners, “The most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not 
what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners, 2002, p. 252).
To recapitulate, there are different ways to define an actor in IR and, as a consequence, to 
justify its comparability with other actors. Paradoxically, a majority of works analysed in this article 
do not refer to the question of comparability at all, they merely proceed to compare official US 
and EU documents or specific policies (see Berenskoetter 2005; Bridoux and Kurki, 2015; Coffman, 
Wites and Youngs, 2009; del Biondo, 2015, 2016; Durac and Cavatorta 2009a, b; Huber, 2008, 
2017; Lavenex et al, 2017; Omelicheva, 2015; Zyla, 2015). This lack of concern can be attributed 
to the object of study: the majority of publications following this strategy focus on democratiza-
tion policies or trade-related issues (where it is easier to discuss EU-level decisions), or analyse 
official EU-level documents.
The second most common strategy is observed predominantly in, though not limited to, lit-
erature dedicated to the analysis of the so-called transatlantic rift (see Balibar, 2003; Buzan and 
Gonzalez Velez, 2005; Cox 2003; Heiduk, 2011; Kagan, 2002). Given that the majority of publications 
in this second group focus on disagreements between Europeans and Americans after the Iraq 
war, they tend to use the concepts of Europe, Europeans, and European countries as synonyms. 
So-called Europe is seen as a unitary actor with specific shared characteristics reflected in its foreign 
policy. This view is illustrated by Cox, who claims that “the world is fast changing not because of 
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terrorism ... but because two of its key players—the United States and Europe—are increasingly 
diverging on how to deal with these key security problems” (Cox, 2003, p. 529). Meanwhile, the 
EU has become a part of this wider and less defined Europe. 
Significantly fewer works belonging to the sample refer to existing definitions of actorness 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Caporaso and Jupille, 1998) to justify the comparison (Börzel et al. 
2015a, 2015b; Brattberg and Rinhard 2012; Murau and Spandler, 2016; Powel, 2009). In various 
cases, these authors also apply the concept of actorness to other actors analysed. Brattberg and 
Rhinard (2012) compare the actorness of the US and the EU as both of are complex, multilevel 
systems. Meanwhile, in her study of democratization efforts, Huber (2015) compares the actor-
ness of the EU, the US, and Turkey, and concludes that although the EU lacks some aspects of 
actorness in foreign policy, it is comparable to other states in the field of democracy promotion. 
In their comparison of the EU, Turkey, Russia and the US’s reactions to so-called “arabellions” in 
North Africa, Börzel and colleagues (2015 a, b) employ a modified definition of actorness by Jupille 
and Caporaso (1998). Finally, Murau and Spandler (2016) analyse the EU, the US, and ASEAN’s 
actorness in IMF reform negotiations within the G20 framework and observe an unexpectedly 
high degree actorness exhibited by the EU. 
The concept of presence is common in the works of regionalists (Hettne and Ponjaert, 2014; 
Telo, 2014), who emphasize the EU’s economic size and strength as its primary source of power. 
Finally, some authors base the comparison between the EU and the US on specific shared charac-
teristics. For example, Fabbrini and Sicurelli (2008) maintain that the EU and the US are comparable 
as they both are compound democracies. Lavenex and colleagues (2017) refer to both the EU and 
the US as “global regulators,” and Zielonka (2011) references them as “kind of empires.”
To conclude, despite being a somewhat non-traditional actor in IR, and despite debates regard-
ing the EU’s actorness, in practice, the EU is compared to states. While concepts like presence or 
actorness often help to establish a common ground for comparison, certain characteristics (includ-
ing the size of its economy, EU-level policy-making procedures in certain fields, and perceptions of 
the EU as a part of a broader concept of Europe) allow authors to proceed with the comparison 
between the foreign policy of the EU and other states without recurring to these concepts. 
2. Analytical matrix of comparative literature 
To understand how different authors perceive similarities and differences between the US and the 
EU’s external actions, I arranged the literature into four groups according to emerging themes and 
level of analysis: the regionalists, the Atlanticists, security studies and democratization studies.
Three different levels of analysis are distinguished. Macro level works consider the place of the 
EU and the US within the international system; mid-level literature deals with regional coopera-
tion, relations with specific geographical regions, or broad sectorial strategies in various countries; 
and micro-level literature analyses and compares cases with a single country and sector. Table 1 
illustrates the analytical matrix.
While the first two groups focus mostly on the macro- or mid-level analysis by analysing the 
most general features of the EU and the US as international actors, the third and fourth groups 
focus on mid- and micro-levels are comprised mostly of country or sector case studies. Themati-
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cally, the first group of literature, written by the regionalists, includes works featuring different 
regionalism models promoted by the EU and the US. The second group of literature, authored by 
the Atlanticists, is comprised of works concerned with the current and future transatlantic relations. 
The works in the third group, security studies, compare security strategies, and the literature in 
the fourth group, democratization studies, compares the EU and the US’s democratization efforts. 
Table 1: Analytical matrix of comparative literature groups 
Group Macro Mid Micro
Regionalists
• Analyse the regional orders promoted by the EU and US.
• Analyse the ways that the EU and US export their rules.
• Try to define the EU’s role in the regionalist processes.
• Majority of works – macro level. Mid-level works concen-
trated on NAFTA and EU comparison.
• Few micro-level studies, focusing on precise cases of EU and 
US’s interaction with emerging economies or comparison of 
EU and US’s actorness in multilateral negotiations.
+ (majority) + (NAFTA 
and EU com-
parisons)
+ 
Atlanticists
• Analyse differences in security cultures and the state of 
Transatlantic relations, their works are strongly influenced 
by Kagan’s (2003) claim about different security cultures in 
the US and Europe.
• Analyse different aspects of the EU and US’s foreign policy 
through the lenses of realism and often refer rather to „Eu-
rope“ as a unitary.
• Majority of works – broad macro level studies.
+
Democratization studies
• Analyse how differences (both observed by the Regionalists 
and the Atlanticists) are reflected in the praxis of democracy 
promotion (in some cases – development aid or relief poli-
cies).
• Majority of works – country level case studies.
+ + (majority)
Security studies
• Analyse if/how the claims made by the Atlanticists are re-
flected in security documents/praxis.
• Majority of works – micro level analysis of documents or 
security policies in different contexts.
+
While this proposed classification is not flawless, not all of the authors’ works fit neatly into 
a group, it relates the main interrogations behind existing comparisons of the EU and the US’s 
foreign policies in different fields and generates new observations regarding the role of the EU 
as an actor in IR.
2.1. “The Regionalists”: Representatives of different world orders
2.1.1. Comparing NAFTA and EU as models of integration
The end of the Cold War and accelerating different regional integration processes stimulated 
discussions about the creation of a new world order. At the time, the EU and the US were 
compared as promoters of integration processes: In North America, the North American Free 
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Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was established and in Eastern and Central Europe the Eastern en-
largement was underway (Gamble and Payne, 1996; Bruszt and McDermott, 2011; Bruszt and 
Greskovitz, 2009).
One line of investigation on this topic attempts to conceptualise regional orders formed around 
different regional powers. Gamble and Payne (1996) employ an international political economy 
perspective and a world order approach to distinguish three modes of regional block formation: 
American, European, and Asian. They base their ideal types in three regional organisations: NAFTA, 
the EU, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The precise differences between 
regional models are not clearly defined. Nevertheless, the authors state, “Although regionalist 
projects have certain assumptions in common ... they are also quite different from one another. 
This diversity reflects the different historical structures which exist within each region, as well as 
the uneven impact of globalisation” (Gamble and Payne, 1996, p. 253). This work forged a path 
towards defining and explaining differences among these regional formations. 
The mid-level analysis works in this group focus mostly on economic integration and rule 
transfer, and their consequences within NAFTA and the EU. Bruszt and Greskovits (2009) anal-
yse how differences in capitalism that emerged in peripheral regions relate to interactions with 
neighbouring hegemons. The authors attempt to explain how different economic and regulatory 
integration modes affect political and economic regimes in third-wave democracies. They ob-
serve that the EU’s policies towards potential members-states in the East helped to strengthen 
domestic demand for policy change and inclusion. Bruszt and Greskovits observe, that “while the 
EU empowers the diverse public and private actors, not simply via resources but particularly by 
enhancing their political and functional participation in institution building efforts, the emphasis 
on economic incentives in NAFTA provide weak bottom up pressure for altering the properties of 
regulations and of the regulative state” (Bruszt and Greskovits, pp. 34-42).
Similarly, Bruszt and McDermott (2011, 2014, 2016) compare NAFTA and the EU in order to 
understand how international integration regimes affect the formation of national regulatory in-
stitutions in developing economies. These authors observe that the US is less willing to strengthen 
political integration and prefers to limit itself with economic cooperation under its own rules. 
Meanwhile, the EU pays more attention to deeply diffusing its standards and is consciously trying 
to diminish existing asymmetries between current and potential member states. Risse (2015) and 
Sbragia (2007) observed similar trends.
Analyses of both mid- and macro-level approaches in the literature indicate differences be-
tween regional integration models promoted by the US and the EU. The authors belonging to the 
first group claim that the model proposed by the EU is: (a) significantly different from the US’s, 
both in its principles and in its implementation; and (b) that the model preferred by the EU was 
deeper and more transformative. 
Furthermore, they relate differences in how the EU and the US view trade (free trade vs. stra-
tegic trade) and ideas behind integration mechanisms (technical approach, related with precise, 
most often economic questions vs. ideas-based approach with an emphasis on socialization and 
the creation of joint mechanisms of managing integration). 
Finally, the authors compare NAFTA and the EU as examples of different integration processes. 
As a consequence, the peculiarities of the EU integration model, in that it transforms neighbour-
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ing countries into member states, often explain why the EU’s model is so different. Nevertheless, 
these studies led to a broader comparison of the EU and the US’s external governance models. 
2.1.2. Qualitatively different model of EU cooperation?
As the EU integration process gained depth and intensity, regionalists shifted their attention 
towards the interrelations between regional hegemons (including the EU and the US) and other 
states. In their analysis of the EU and US from a regionalist perspective, Hettne and Ponjaert (2014) 
conclude that they represent two different world orders: Pax Americana, marked by unilateralism, 
dominance, and asymmetrical relations; and Pax Europea, based in multilateralism, partnership, 
and dialogue. The authors second the Gamble and Payne’s main arguments and explain the dif-
ference in models through historical experiences. They note that, at the moment, both sides of 
the Atlantic Ocean represent two different world orders (Grugel, 2004; Escribano, 2007). 
Common among these authors is recognition of the EU as an independent regional actor, 
capable of proposing different cooperation and integration stimuli and models that are not 
limited to the possibility of membership. They claim that the principles of the EU’s international 
governance are rooted in its integration process, and this is the crucial difference between the 
experiences of the EU and the US. 
Telo (2007, 2014) observes that unlike the US, the EU promotes regional cooperation and 
fosters regionalisation processes by helping to create regional organisations. Meanwhile, the 
US prefers to forge bilateral agreements directly with other countries. In assessing the EU and 
the US’s relations with Latin American countries, Escribano (2007) claims that the EU not only 
qualitatively differs from other actors in international relations, but also proposes an alternative 
model for organising the international community in the face of globalisation (Escribano, 2007, 
p. 19). Many authors explain the EU’s so-called exceptionality by claiming that the EU’s history of 
integration and the principles of its foundation affect its external policy. 
Somehow different from the rest of the group, nevertheless very interesting, are two recent 
mid-micro level studies dedicated to the global rules expansion and actorness of the EU and the 
US. The first is a special edition of the European Foreign Affairs Review dedicated to the analysis 
of the EU and the US’s attempts at norm transfer with emerging economies (Lavenex et al., 2017). 
Meanwhile, the other study compares the actorness of the EU, the ASEAN, and the US in the IMF’s 
reform negotiations within the G20 framework (Murau and Spandler, 2016). While both studies 
have different goals, they both emphasize the similarities between compared actors, in this man-
ner they distinguish themselves from the rest of the work in the group. 
To summarise, the turn of the century marked a shift from the analysis of EU’s integration 
processes (or integration as a tool of its foreign policy) to that of its relations with other countries 
and regions. Regionalists have become more enthusiastic about the fundamental differences 
between the integration models and world orders created by the US and the EU; they highlight 
examples aligning the US with unilateralism and the EU with multilateralism intertwined with 
inter-regionalism. Furthermore, in some cases, sometimes following the logic of the NPE con-
cept, the EU’s cooperation model is seen as more normative and democratic than that of the 
US. Therefore, while works before the aforementioned shift, see the EU as unique merely due to 
its structure in that it was born and grew due to regional integration processes, later works see 
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the EU positively, as not only as unique entity but also as an advocate of an alternative mode of 
integration and regional cooperation.
Although it is not always expressed, it often seems that in comparison to the US, the EU rep-
resents a less selfish and more normative cooperation model. Nevertheless, at the same time, the 
many authors participating in the NPE debate (Diez, 2005, Hyde Price, 2006; Martin-Maze, 2015; 
Tocci, 2008) espouse a more critical than positive view of the EU. Studies (Youngs 2004; Barbé 
and Johansson-Nogués, 2008) show contradictions between the goals and instruments in the 
EUs’ foreign policy, especially in its neighbourhood, and a deep interrelation and complementar-
ity between norms and interests in general. Furthermore, various authors observe that the US’s 
foreign policy is not less value-driven than the EU’s (Diez, 2005; Hamilton, 2008). 
 Finally, regionalists are more interested in the economy and values. They are less interested 
in power, especially military power, and power asymmetries between the EU and US and other 
players in the international system. The question of power, as a preponderance of military and 
economic means—and, as an extension, of weakness—is far more interesting to the scholars in 
the second group, the Atlanticists. 
2.2. “The Atlanticists”: Representatives of different planets
The events of September 11, 2001 and the US’s subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq trig-
gered what can be considered a renaissance in analyses of the US and EU’s relations and their 
foreign policies. The unilateralism of George W. Bush‘s administration and the resistance of some 
Western European countries like France and Germany to support the military operation in Iraq, 
prompted interest in the future of transatlantic relations. One of the most famous works discuss-
ing the different views of Europeans and Americans towards the international system, is Robert 
Kagan’s Of Paradise and Power (2003). The author states, “On major strategic and international 
questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little 
and understand one another less and less” (2003, p. 3). Kagan’s central assertion is that the EU 
and the US, due to differences in their historical circumstances and material resources, not only 
act differently in the international system, but also approach the international system completely 
differently. Kagan’s work and this statement have become a framework for academic discussions 
of international relations and foreign policy analysis.
According to Kagan, differences in American and European approaches to security can be 
attributed to the resources they have and are willing to use to achieve their goals. Americans 
solve problems using all of the resources available to them, including military resources, while 
Europeans give priority to instruments that brought prosperity after 1945: negotiations, trade, and 
multilateralism. Kagan’s core ideas are based on a realist perspective and emphasize the notion of 
power. In his article, Power and Weakness, (2002) he argues that unlike the US, Europe deliberately 
chose to abandon Hobbesian politics; as a consequence, the EU’s foreign policy instruments are 
soft “weapons of the weak”. Kagan argues that the main source of tensions between the two sides 
of the Atlantic lies in Europeans not wanting to admit that their post-war economic miracle was 
supported by the US, which, was the deus ex machine that led to world order and guaranteed 
European security (Kagan, 2003, pp. 58-59). 
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Kagan’s ideas were not new, but, perhaps due to very appropriate timing, his arguments were 
widely discussed in the fields of international relations, foreign policy analysis, and security studies. 
The majority of authors concurring with Kagan’s are concerned with transatlantic partnership 
and with describing foreign policy differences seen on either side of the Atlantic. In some cases they 
seek to explain these differences and propose guidelines for transatlantic cooperation (Andrews 
2005; Buzan and Gonzalez Velez, 2005; Cox 2012; Parsi, 2006; Pond, 2004). Most of these authors 
agree with Kagan’s main ideas about the differences between the US and the EU. Nevertheless, 
many of them are unclear in communicating whether they are analysing the objectives, measures 
or specific instruments used by both powers (Berenskoetter, 2005). Interestingly, many authors 
analysing the EU and US “strategic culture” prefer discourse or historical analysis to a thorough 
examination of the specific actions of each actor and strategic documents.
Seeking to explain differences between the EU and the US’s strategic cultures, many scholars 
mention the EU and the US’s different historical experiences and the EU’s unique institutional 
setting. Zielonka summarizes this argument well, “Europe’s polycentric system of governance is 
more suited to creating institutional structures and setting up the rules of legitimate behaviour 
than to swift and bold power projection abroad ... the EU’s system of governance is conducive to 
the type of foreign policy advocated by Hugo Grotius or Immanuel Kant, but ill-matched to the 
type of policies advocated by Thomas Hobbes or Niccolo Machiavelli.” (2011, p. 297).
Nevertheless, the realist group ignores most types of power assets such as economic power 
and asserts that the primary factor for the EU and the US’s different security cultures and foreign 
policies is their differing military capabilities (Balibar, 2003). While realists’ emphasis on military 
power is in general typical, this emphasis could be related to the fact that most of the realists’ 
works rely on the analyses of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and their aftermath. 
While regionalists tend to favour the EU, realists often seemed to side with the US, which they 
depict as more capable of properly responding to the contemporary security challenges like ter-
rorism or rogue states. They portray Europeans, in turn, as attempting to avoid these challenges. 
Often, these arguments turn into an open critique of so-called anachronistic Europeans who are 
actively avoiding real-world commitments.
Asmus and Pollack (2002), Cavatorta and Durac, (2011), Kissinger, Summers, and Kupchan 
(2004) propose more nuanced views of the differences between the EU and the US’s security 
cultures. This group of scholars argue that Kagan’s arguments are simplistic. Though they agree 
that there are some fundamental differences between the EU and the US due to differing histori-
cal experiences power resources, they point out that most of the differences between the two 
powers are reflected in tactics more than strategy, and are related to rather specific cases of Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
Concluding, the events that marked international politics at the beginning of the 21st century 
sparked a security-lens analysis of EU and US relations. Kagan and others’ main proposes that the 
EU and the US view security and international relations in fundamentally different ways. Authors 
worry about what these differences mean for the international system, primarily regarding security. 
Most authors consider the US and the EU as actors in international relations solely through the 
lenses of realism; they perceive power mainly as military power and pay less attention to other 
types of power such as structural power. Most of the works analysed in this paper are from the field 
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of international relations, and the analysis conducted therein is macro-level analysis, dealing with 
the US and the EU’s responses to international political events and their roles in the international 
system. His works, tackling differences between the EU and the US, have been cited more than 
4,000 times in Google Scholar, JSTOR digital library and Scopus reference database.
Insights about the differences of EU and US foreign policy have become a starting point for 
micro-level empirical research looking at US and EU’s actions in different regions or issues in the 
same thematic areas (e.g., security policies) (Berenskoetter, 2005; Garlicki, 2014; Rees, 2011; 
Zyla, 2015). 
2.3. Into the details: Security studies
The Mars and Venus narrative and the changing international security situation framed further 
analyses of the EU and US’s security strategies. For example, Daalder (2001, p. 553) argues that 
fundamental differences between the two actors contribute to a divergent definition of threat. 
According him, the US puts an emphasis on new security threats like emerging terrorist groups, or 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The EU, in turn, is focused on global challenges 
such as climate change, migration, poverty, and human trafficking. 
Garlicki (2014) draws similar conclusions in his comparison of the US and the EU’s security 
approaches. Garlicki writes, “since the end of the Cold War, there have been two different ap-
proaches to security in transatlantic relations: the American one and the European one. The first 
one has been focusing more on military issues, while the latter one on civil aspects of security.“ 
Furthermore, he points to an EU preference for multilateralism and an US preference for unilater-
alism. However, his work, like the works preceding it, focuses on the cases of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and is not concerned with an analysis of relevant security documents. Nevertheless, 
various authors undertake the task of comparing the actual security strategies of both powers. In 
this article, this particular school of work is referred to as the security studies group.
Berenskoetter (2005) compares the US and the EU security strategies during George W. Bush’s 
presidential term. Berenskoetter addresses the shortcomings of more general-level works as he 
observes a lack of clarity regarding what was compared: objectives or strategies to achieve objec-
tives. In examining the EU and the US’s security strategy documents Berenskoetter distinguishes 
between their: (a) realm of responsibilities, (b) assessment of threats, and (c) the tasks and instru-
ments identified as necessary for addressing threats.
Berenskoetter asserts that semantically the two strategies are very similar in that they have 
similar goals and obligations (e.g., development of democracy, defence of human rights,). On the 
other hand, he notices differences, both confirming and denying the Kagan’s “Mars and Venus” 
argument. Berenskoetter claims, “At first glance, the major fault lines fit familiar stereotypes: here, 
the USA, the self-appointed global defender of the liberal ideal, with a strong tendency towards 
unilateralism and forward-leaning militarism; there, the EU, primarily concerned with the process 
of European integration, favouring multilateralism and non-military tools” (2005, p. 88).
On the other hand, the author also notices that contrary to expectations, the US’s security 
strategy is far less realistic and more normative than the EU’s security strategy, which, Berenskoet-
ter states, relies more on non-utopian ideas about the ideal world order (Berenskoetter, 2015, 
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p. 89). Besides, Berenskoetter does not find any differences in the threat perceptions of the two 
actors. While the Mars versus Venus argument holds that the United States is more interested in 
hard threats—like terrorism or aggressive states— and the EU is more concerned with soft threats, 
the definition of threat in their respective strategies is mostly the same.
Benjamin Zyla (2015) compares the US and the EU’s security strategies during the Obama 
presidency, seeking to understand the security culture of both actors. He notes that while the 
US and the EU share beliefs and ideals about goals, prefer common instruments in international 
security policy, and favoured the same forms of international cooperation, they have completely 
different approaches to the structure of the international system, the role of international organisa-
tions, and how to respond to emerging threats. The US sees itself primarily as a world hegemon 
and pursues this position, while the EU sees the international system as consisting of sovereign, 
interconnected states, whose cooperation is needed both to deepen trade and to open borders.
Oliverio (2008) compares the attitude of the US and the EU towards international and domes-
tic terrorism, he argues that Europeans respond to the threat of terrorism very differently than 
the US. Oliverio (2008) writes that after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Americans 
began to see the fight against terrorism as a moral crusade, and the media contributed to existing 
public perceptions of Iraq as a terrorist state. The EU, says Oliverio, which has a longer experience 
of tackling terrorism (and has a large and often poorly integrated Muslim community), tends to 
regard terrorism as a crime. The EU is not prone to launching preventive strikes or pursuing mili-
tary intervention in response to terrorism, relying instead on intelligence and targeted actions.
Most of the authors from security studies group compare the EU and the US’s documents 
and discourse. Although these scholars discuss how the EU and the US perceive their foreign 
policy and security issues, they do not analyse how both actors implement their strategies. In 
an attempt to do analyse implementation of strategies, Heiduk (2011) compares the US and the 
EU’s approaches to strengthening the Afghani police. Departing from the Mars and Venus argu-
ment, he analyses whether Europeans are more likely to train democratic, civilian Afghani police, 
while Americans aim to transform the police force into an auxiliary military force for the Afghan 
army. His findings are contradictory, “These differences between the strategic cultures of Europe 
and the US - between Mars and Venus - seemed to have been most apparent on a macro-level 
concerning the ‘no’ of most EU member states to the Iraq invasion in 2003. They also seem to 
become distinct on the micro-level, that is when comparing EU and US approaches to police as-
sistance in Afghanistan” (2011, p.363). Heiduk observes that both powers contributed equally to 
the militarization of the local police. 
To conclude, a micro-level analysis of discourse and behaviour shows a more nuanced picture 
of differences between the EU and the US compared to macro or mid-level works. The majority 
of authors from the security studies group are interested in testing whether the Mars and Venus 
argument is reflected in the EU and the US’s strategic documents and actions. While some of the 
scholar’s arguments have been confirmed (e.g., the US’s preference for unilateralism), others—such 
as the two powers holding differing definitions of threat or the EU’s aversion to militarization—
have been refuted. The authors in this group are not interested in the sources of differences; their 
primary goal is to test macro-level constructions.
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2.4. Into the details: democratization studies 
As both the EU and the US are the most prominent development aid donors and promoters of de-
mocracy, democratization presents another field in which comparisons of their policies proliferate. 
Del Biondo (2016, p. 11) states that the “EU and the United States are very different foreign policy 
actors, and this is also reflected in their development policies.” Various authors in democratization 
studies test macro-level theories regarding these development policy differences, thus the majority 
of these works are micro-level analyses of the strategies, instruments, and goals the US and the 
EU use to promote democracy and human rights in specific countries or regions. The Middle East 
and North Africa get most of the spotlight, reflecting an increased interest in these regions and 
growing links between security, democratization, and development aid in the twenty-first century.
One of the main goals of the democratization studies authors is to identify a guiding influ-
ence—such as security interests or defence of values perceived as universal—on the actions of 
both actors. One group of authors argues that the US is more proactive, or even aggressive, than 
the EU in defending and promoting democratization and human rights, by actively advocating its 
policies and building on bottom-up strategies. In turn, these scholars assert the EU for frequently 
cooperates with undemocratic governments; they view the EU as more pragmatic, suggest the 
EU prefers stability to radical change (Huber, 2008; Khana, 2004), and argue that the EU favours 
cooperation over conflict (Stahn and van Hüllen, 2007). Another sub-group of democratization 
studies’ authors, on the other hand, emphasizes that the US’s support is more politicised and 
instrumental to its strategic objectives. Furthermore, due to processes within the EU, the EU’s 
support is much less dependent on political processes within the Union (Del Biondo, 2016), and 
its democratization strategies are much more holistic and robust than those of the US (Holden, 
2009; Börzel et al., 2015).
The second discussion within this group is centred on the kind of changes the US and the EU 
are promoting. Some authors claim that the US is more likely to seek the radical transformation 
of a given regime and provide support to civil society rather than support undemocratic states; 
these authors argue that the EU is more focused on long-term state-building and social develop-
ment processes even in non-democratic states than the US (Bridoux and Kurki, 2014; Kopstein, 
2006). This argument, however, does not always hold. Durac and Cavatorta (2006, p. 7) observe 
that in the case of the US’s Middle East Partnership Initiative, despite declared objectives, over 
70 per cent of US aid was devoted to programs that directly reinforced Arab state agencies or 
government training and only 18 per cent of all funds went to non-governmental organisations. 
Nevertheless, other democratization studies’ authors argue that there are more similarities 
than differences between the US and the EU, taking into account their goals and their strategies. 
According to Cavatorta (2009), when analysing the US and the EU’s objectives and instruments in 
North Africa, it is clear that these actors are more similar than different. He writes that the images 
of the EU as a good cop and the US as the bad cop are not due to fundamental differences, but 
due to the EU’s ability to present itself better than the US does.
Durac and Cavatorta (2009, p. 3) analyse the US and the EU’s democracy promotion policies 
in North Africa and conclude that both actors pursued similar objectives with similar restrictions 
and suffered from the same contradictions and policy gaps. Similarly, Huber (2017) observes that 
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in North Africa, the EU and the US’s policies towards youth are very similar; both powers promote 
a neoliberal economic and social model. Likewise, both actors seem to prefer a particular—and 
to a certain point, shared—understanding of democracy rooted in their experiences and ideals, 
ignoring the context where the policies are implemented (Omelicheva, 2015). Furthermore, Börzel 
and collegues (2015a; 2015b) in their study of external actors’ reaction to so-called Arabellions, 
observe that as an agent of democratization, in some ways the EU is similar not only to the US, 
but also to non-democratic countries like Russia or Turkey. 
Finally, even those authors, who distinguish specific differences in the policies of the EU and 
the US (Holden 2009; Huber, 2008; del Biondo, 2016) agree that the goals and strategies of the 
EU and the US, over time, are becoming more and more alike.
The majority of authors in the democratization group publish micro-level, country, or policy-
based case studies. The only mid-level work belonging to the democratization studies group 
(Magen et al. 2009) is a comparative study of the EU and the US’s democracy promotion policies 
in different regions. After analysing the democratization policies of both powers in the Middle 
East, Latin America, North Africa, the Southern Caucasus, and Indonesia, the authors of this mid-
level analysis conclude that the US and the EU are not very different: they share the same goals, 
promote a very similar set of values, and use similar instruments to achieve those goals. 
As Magen and colleagues state, “One could even argue that the democracy promotion policies 
of the EU and the US resemble those of ‘civilian powers’ in the sense that non-military means 
and cooperative practices are far more prominent than the use of force and sanctions” (Magen 
et al., 2008, p. 250). They add, “the use of the various instruments of democracy promotion does 
not so reflect the characteristics of the promoting agents (the US vs. the EU), but depends more 
on the geostrategic context and the political circumstances of the target countries” (Magen et 
al., 2008, p. 250).
Like the scholars in the security studies group, the authors analysing democratization policies 
are less interested in the roots of the differences between the powers. Nevertheless, when they 
try to explain them, they turn to either to differing historical developments or to the structure of 
actors, where the encounter the actorness dilemma (Magen et al., 2008; Börzel et al. 2015; del 
Biondo, 2016). For example, some claim that the EU’s history of EU integration and the different 
approaches of the EU and the US to post-Soviet democratization processes have shaped their 
cooperation (Kopstein, 2016, Magen et al., 2008). 
3. Overview of the comparison
The main divergence between the regionalists and the Atlanticists lies in their respective views 
of the role the US and the EU play in international relations. The regionalists, often mirroring 
the NPE debate, tend to have a rather positive assessment of the EU as a qualitatively different 
power—one that is more democratic, bases its interactions on the principles of multilateralism, 
and is more willing to bind itself with international agreements. On the other hand, the Atlanticists 
claim that while the EU’s foreign policy goals and instruments differ from those of the US, this is 
not due to the EU’s normativity, but to its lack of military power and the EU’s aversion to power 
politics. Thus, Atlanticists often perceive the EU as weaker than the US, and they perceive the 
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latter more positively due to its capacity to assume international challenges. In turn, the security 
studies group and the democratization studies group propose a more nuanced analysis, arguing 
that in different contexts and different fields, both actors can act rather similarly.
Although both macro-level groups generally agree about the roots of differences between 
both actors (different decision-making processes, levels of actorness, power assets, and historical 
experiences) they give priority to somewhat different elements. The regionalists emphasise the 
multi-layered structure of the EU and its experience of integration, the Atlanticists prefer different 
power capabilities and the conflictive history of the European continent as explanatory variables. 
Finally, it can be observed that the most important research themes in both macro-level groups 
are related to two dichotomies—power versus weakness and normativity versus pragmatism—
found in broader debates in the fields of EU studies and international relations. The question of 
norms and interests has already been touched on in this article, there is no simple way to separate 
one from the other. As for the discussion of power versus weakness, it mirrors broader consider-
ations of the importance of hard and soft power. How important is military power in the power 
politics of the twenty-first century? Moravscik (2017) asserts, “[Europe] ... manipulates economic 
power with skill and success unmatched by any other country or region. Also, its ability to employ 
‘soft power’ to persuade other countries to change their behaviour is unique.” 
Conclusion
Different, nevertheless, related academic discussions presented in this article lead to the following 
observations regarding the particularities of the EU’s external actions and the utility of comparison. 
Firstly, comparisons of the EU to the US have become more common. Many authors do not feel a 
need to justify comparability, and this shows that the EU has managed to become an international 
relations actor and is, at least to some point, comparable to more traditional actors. Judging from 
the number of studies, the main areas where comparisons can be made between the EU and the 
US are related to the fields of democratization, (economic) regionalism, and development policy. 
Within the analysis of the macro-level security-related topics, the concept of Europe prevailed 
over the EU. Nevertheless, these studies were mostly written in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. In the after-the-Lisbon-treaty context, and bearing in mind the push for better coordina-
tion of EU´s response to rising security threats, do the claims made by the Atlanticists still hold 
and if yes, to what extent? The realists are somewhat sceptical of studies of the EU’s foreign policy, 
as their primary object of interrogation is a state. Nevertheless, neoclassical realism might be a 
useful paradigm for questions regarding the EU´s security culture.
Secondly, the tension between macro-level works (observing significant differences between 
two actors) and mid/micro-level works (painting a more nuanced picture) shows that despite 
its particularities, in many ways, the EU acts similarly like other actors. Hence, more attention 
should be paid not to differences between the EU and other actors, but to their similarities. This 
type of comparison could enrich not only EU studies but also other IR sub-fields like the studies 
of (regional/great) powers or hegemony. Diez (2013) and Haukkala (2008, 2017) have already 
proposed solutions to problems of the NPE debate by naming the EU as a (normative) hegemon. 
How does this “hegemon” compare to others in the IR? 
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Thirdly, while many authors have criticised the NPE concept, there is one repetitive claim in 
regionalists’ works, which signals the EU’s exceptionality. Since the early comparisons between 
EU and NAFTA as integration models, there have been recurring claims about the fact that unlike 
the US, the EU is trying to diminish the existing asymmetry existing between it and its partners. 
Various authors, studying European Neighbourhood Policy, claim that the EU might act in neo-
colonial or even imperialistic ways. Nevertheless, the comparison with neighbourhood policies of 
other regional or great powers (or, referring to the abovementioned discussion, hegemons) would 
help in understanding if the EU’s “hegemony” can be considered exceptional.
Finally, the concept of effectiveness, is more and more salient in EU studies and has been 
absent from the comparisons discussed. Many authors seem to agree that the EU’s foreign policy 
lacks effectiveness. Nevertheless, the US’s inability to tackle the situation in Central America or 
democratize Iraq does not tend to lead to such damning conclusions about the US. Hence, the 
comparison could be helpful in corroborating whether the EU is “exceptionally ineffective.” Even 
more, the comparison with the EU might lead to new insights into the limitations of other, tradi-
tional actors in international relations.
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